Suncor Energy Inc. contacted Synodon as part of an effort to enhance pipeline leak detection. Ideally, Suncor needed a technology that could detect natural gas as well as liquid hydrocarbon releases. Synodon's new technology is an aircraft mounted gas remote sensing instrument that has been used for detecting leaks from natural gas pipelines for over four (4) years and was expanding their capability to include liquid hydrocarbons. This paper will describe the steps that Suncor and Synodon have taken over the last two years to develop and validate this detection technology. Synodon completed a number of studies including laboratory and field tests that demonstrated the ability of Synodon's technology to remotely detect groundlevel plumes of vapours released from a liquid hydrocarbon pipeline. Synodon conducted full atmospheric analytic modeling followed by laboratory measurements to determine the level of sensitivity of its instrument measurement to both methane and various liquid hydrocarbon vapors including gasoline, condensates and synthetic crude oil. Suncor participated in the development of test methodology and field execution in order to witness and validate the results. Based on this work, Suncor has determined an optimum inspection frequency based on theoretical spill size, SCADA leak detection thresholds and conventional aerial patrol constraints.
Synodon's new technology is an aircraft mounted gas remote sensing instrument that has been used for detecting leaks from natural gas pipelines for over four (4) years and was expanding their capability to include liquid hydrocarbons. This paper will describe the steps that Suncor and Synodon have taken over the last two years to develop and validate this detection technology. Synodon completed a number of studies including laboratory and field tests that demonstrated the ability of Synodon's technology to remotely detect groundlevel plumes of vapours released from a liquid hydrocarbon pipeline. Synodon conducted full atmospheric analytic modeling followed by laboratory measurements to determine the level of sensitivity of its instrument measurement to both methane and various liquid hydrocarbon vapors including gasoline, condensates and synthetic crude oil. Suncor participated in the development of test methodology and field execution in order to witness and validate the results. Based on this work, Suncor has determined an optimum inspection frequency based on theoretical spill size, SCADA leak detection thresholds and conventional aerial patrol constraints.
The results and conclusions of this work will be presented.
-NEEDS ASSESSMENT
Liquid pipeline leak detection is a key part of Suncor's pipeline risk management and several different approaches are used to ensure early detection of releases. These approaches include SCADA leak detection, aerial patrol, ground patrol and acoustic technologies (some pipelines). Suncor is in the process of evaluating additional technologies to enhance early detection of releases.
Historically, operators have shown a strong preference for leak detection that utilizes field equipment that is already in place. This accounts for the dominance of leak detection by Pressure/Flow Monitoring and CPM on pipelines, since the monitoring is already provided by the SCADA system, and the CPM is a relatively inexpensive addition to an existing metering infrastructure.
PHMSA has published a report entitled Leak Detection Study DTPH56-11-D-000001
[1]. Notionally, this report highlights an opportunity for additional technologies to be applied to enhance pipeline leak detection. This report aggregates data over a large number of leak sizes and as such, does not accurately reflect the real-life performance of CPM systems.
Leak detection by CPM is limited by the accuracy of the metering and uncertainties in the line fill, both of which can have errors in the 1-5% of the pipeline flow rate (certain ideal pipeline configurations can achieve slightly better results over shorter distances but this looks at an industry wide view). Therefore conventional SCADA leak detection thresholds are typically at best 1% of throughput. To get a more correct understanding of this, the raw industry submitted leak data cataloged by PHMSA over the 2002 -2009 period was analyzed. A total of 3031 hazardous liquid leaks were reported during this time interval of which under a third were deemed to be significant leaks. The chart in Figure 1 breaks down the methods which were reported as the initial leak identification factor and shows operating personnel and third party sources at 71% and CPM at an average of 8%. Figure 2 however breaks down the performance of the CPM system per leak size category and as expected, the effectiveness at alarming larger leaks is much higher than for small leaks.
Figure 2: CPM Detection Performance with Leak Size
To enhance the detection of smaller releases, pipeline operators augmented their leak detection with the monthly aerial visual patrols. Besides being on the lookout for RoW activity, the pilot or operator is also looking for leak clues such as obvious pools of product, water sheen, effects on vegetation, etc. Unfortunately, the same breakdown of leak detection performance vs leak size finds that the effectiveness of these visual patrols at detecting leaks is not very good.
Figure 3: Aerial Patrol Performance with Leak Size
Even more importantly, the aerial patrols are nondeterministic since they rely on a human interpreter to evaluate the ground clues and determine if there are potential leaks present.
Based on the current CPM and aerial patrol industry reported performance, a technology enabled survey that would have the ability to detect leaks of less than 500 barrels while also increasing detection probability has the potential to enhance the early detection of releases.
-TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION
Gas-Filter Correlation Radiometry (GFCR) was employed in some of the first remote sensing measurements made from satellites, and continues to be used today to measure atmospheric temperature and composition. An example of such an instrument is the Canadian-made MOPITT (Measurement Of Pollution In The Troposphere) instrument. MOPITT, which has been operating on NASA's Terra satellite, measures atmospheric carbon monoxide (CO) and methane (CH 4 ).
As its name suggests, a GFCR uses a sample of a gas as a spectral filter for the gas. The principle of the GFCR being developed is shown in Figure 4 . 
Figure 4: GFCR Conceptual Diagram
Incoming radiation is first passed through a narrow band-pass filter (as is the case in any typical radiometer). The beam is then split along two paths; one path containing a gas cell filled with the gas of interest (known as the correlation cell) and the other path containing no gas. The correlation cell acts as a spectral filter, removing energy from the incoming beam at the wavelengths corresponding to the absorption lines of the gas. The radiant fluxes in each path are then measured by infrared detectors, and the signals are analyzed.
Figure 5: GFCR Measurement Principle
The detection of a cloud of "leaked" gas by a GFCR is shown schematically in Figure 5 . The instrument detects two signals, S1 and S2 respectively. If a cloud of leaked natural gas is in the field-of-view, the signal in channel 1 will be reduced due to the absorption of methane, (S1 -ε). However, since channel 2 already has the wavelengths of energy absorbed by methane removed, the signal does not change.
The choice of a GFCR to measure the natural gas leaks was made for a number of reasons. The advantages of GFCRs include:
A helicopter mounted GFCR tuned to detect natural gas, has been operated by Synodon for 5 years. In this implementation, the instrument uses mid-infrared, reflected sunlight to measure the leaked natural gas in the entire column of air between the helicopter and the ground ( Figure 6 ) without flying through the plume of the leak. 
-TECHNOLOGY VALIDATION APPROACH AND RESULTS
Over the last two years, Synodon has explored and ultimately demonstrated the ability of this technology to detect vapour plumes emanating from various liquid hydrocarbon products, including pentane, gasoline, natural gas condensates and crude oils. Since there is no publicly available knowledge about the response of a GFCR to complex molecule plumes, a rigorous process was put in place to evaluate its effectiveness. The main steps involved in this research included:
• analytic performance modeling of the technology, • model verification through laboratory measurements of instrument sensitivities to pentane, gasoline, diesel and methanol • static ground testing of sensitivity to free air pentane plumes • confirmation of the EPA Liquid Evaporation model using a controlled, wind tunnel setup for a number of hydrocarbon liquids including pentane, gasoline, condensate, diesel and a variety of crudes, and • airborne measurements of instrument sensitivities to vapour plumes of pentane, gasoline, condensate, diesel and crudes originating from ground-level releases.
The learnings from this research have been published and presented at a number of conferences over the last 2 years. The remainder of this paper will focus on the results of an airborne detection test using a Suncor supplied synthetic crude known under the product name OSA.
In order to determine the sensitivity threshold to liquid hydrocarbon leaks for any technology, a realistic atmospheric vapour plume would have to be somehow created. The most obvious method for accomplishing this would be to fill a large and shallow container with the product of interest and expose it to the air to create an evaporated plume while fly the technology over it. According to EPA published data, the equation that can be used to approximate the evaporation rate from an open liquid pool is:
Where:
The evaporation rate for spilled liquids depends on several factors, including the volatility of the product, its temperature and molecular weight, plus the surface area and wind speed. Some of these parameters are extremely hard to control or even measure during an open container test (such as wind), and as a consequence, the ability for this test setup to generate consistent and valid results is doubtful. To circumvent this issue, a closed evaporation system was developed to create a controlled stream (or plume) of vapours from a sample of hydrocarbon liquid. It also has the important advantage that the sample of liquid is contained, eliminating the potential of a spill and/or clean-up. A first (small) version of this evaporator system was built and used successfully in early field testing of the instrument, demonstrating the ability to detect evaporated plumes of pentane, gasoline and condensates. A second (larger) version of this initial system was developed for this test in order to account for the lower evaporation rate of the product considered.
The evaporator system is a bubbler, in which N2 gas is bubbled through a sample of the test liquid. As the bubbles travel through the liquid and burst, the liquid evaporates into the gas stream. The amount of liquid which evaporates (i.e. the evaporate rate) from the bubbler is dependent on many factors, including the temperatures of the liquid and gas, the size and number of bubbles, the saturation vapour pressure of the liquid, etc. The evaporation rate from the bubbler is also dependent on the rate of flow of air/N2 through the bubbler. This means that the evaporation rate of liquid can be adjusted by changing the flow rate of N2.
The original liquids evaporation system consisted of a 10 L pressurized paint tank containing a sample of the liquid. A flow of N2 gas from a compressed bottle is forced into the bottom of the tank and bubbles up through the liquid. In operation, the evaporator was filled with approximate 5 litres of liquid. The incoming N2 was released from an aerator stone (i.e. to produce many small bubbles) at the bottom of the bubbler (in the liquid). The outlet of the bubbler was on the top of the tank, allowing the N2 plus the evaporated vapours to escape the tank. This flow was piped to a location downwind of the setup. During the field test, the flow was turned on just before the helicopter carrying the instrument passed overhead and the mass loss from the evaporator was accurately measured to allow for the calculation of the flow rate of evaporated liquids. Figure 7 shows an image of the original tank in operation, hung from a weigh scale.
Figure 7: Original Evaporation System on Weighscale
This original evaporator system proved to be very well suited for the more volatile products tested but it could not generate sufficient amount of vapour from the heavier crude products. This was primarily due to the small amount of product available in the container and the limited amount of evaporation surface. A larger system was built in order to accommodate these new product requirements. Figure 9 and Figure 10 capture the main components of the crude evaporator/bubbler system. Figure 9 shows the 120 liter container/barrel which holds the product. At the bottom of the container, a module composed of 5 aerator stones is used to create a stream of N2 bubbles which serve to increase the effective evaporation surface. The setup is completed by a precision weight scale (shown underneath the container in Figure 9 ) together with its electronic readout display, a compressed air (or nitrogen) flow meter and an accurate timing device ( Figure 10 ). All of these components are organized as shown in Figure  8 . Calibration measurements of the bubbler system for gasoline, diesel and OSA were performed in the lab. Figure 11 shows the change over time in mass of Suncor's synthetic crude product (OSA) during two tests, one using 40 L and the second one using 20 L of the crude. As seen with all hydrocarbon liquids, the evaporation rates decrease over time, primarily due to the lighter components evaporating away. Also as expected, the 20 liter test showed a faster decrease in evaporation rate over time but only starting after the first 7 or 8 minutes. Both these tests were performed using an input compressed air flow of 240 scfh and achieved OSA evaporation rates of between ≈40 g/min.
Figure 11: Mass-loss During Laboratory Calibration
With the evaporation system tested and calibrated in the laboratory, a field test plan was developed consisting of two series of tests. Each series of tests consisted of six passes over the evaporator system with the same flow rate of N2 through the bubbler, and a fresh 20 L sample of OSA was placed in the bubbler at the start of each series of tests. For each flight pass of the bubbler, the flow of N2 was turned on for 1 minute and was turned on roughly 30 to 40 seconds before the helicopter passed overhead. This meant that the length of airflow through the sample of OSA was roughly 6 minutes per sample. The time between each pass of the evaporator system was approximately 3 minutes. The evaporation rate of the sample of OSA was determined by the change in weight of the bubbler system after each pass. Also, by keeping the same flow rate over the 6 passes, a higher accuracy measurement of the evaporation rate for the given flow rate was determined.
The first series of six passes were performed at a N2 flow rate of 250 scfh. This rate was chosen as laboratory calibration of the bubbler system showed that this rate of N2 flow produced an evaporation rate of OSA close to the estimated minimum detectable evaporation rate for OSA, 40 g/min. The intention with this series of tests was to see if our estimate of the minimum OSA evaporation rate detectable was correct.
The second series of six passes were performed at a N2 flow rate of 500 scfh. No lab calibrations at the rate were performed previous to the in-field tests, but the evaporation rate was expected to range from 60 to 80 g/min. The intention with this series of tests was to demonstrate conclusively that the instrument could detect plumes of evaporated OSA. The time between the first and second series of flights was approximately 20 minutes.
The flight tests were performed in a pasture southeast of the intersection of Highway 1 and 40 near Morley, Alberta (43 km east of Canmore, and 74 km west of Calgary). The surface was grassy, away from any obstructions and relatively flat, but somewhat uneven. Figure 12 shows an image of the bubbler system setup in field. Winds were very light (0 to 5 km/hr) and were constantly changing directions throughout the test.
Figure 12: Field Setup of Bubbler System
The table in Figure 13 summarizes the results of the flight test, while Figure 14 shows an image of one of the detected plumes of evaporated OSA vapour. In the first series of tests, the average measured evaporation rate of OSA from the evaporator system was 30 g/min, close to the value achieved in lab calibrations of the evaporator system. A plume of OSA vapours was detected in 3 of 5 passes of the target (a 60% detection rate). The pilot missed the target on 1 of the 6 passes. In the second series of tests, the average measured evaporation rate of OSA from the evaporator system was nearly double, at 55 g/min. In this series of overpasses, OSA vapours were detected in 4 of 5 passes of the target (an 80% detection rate). On one of the passes, there was a weak signature. Finally, the pilot missed the target on the second pass. These tests showed that with an evaporation rate of 30 g/min of OSA, the tested GFCR system was able to detect the plumes roughly 60% of the time. With an evaporation rate of 55 g/min of OSA, the detection rate was higher at 80%.
With the lower end sensitivity threshold for this technology demonstrated at about 30g/min of evaporated OSA, the next step was to determine what size pipeline leak this translates into. Due to the highly variable environment that these leaks can occur under, the problem was constrained by assuming that a small pool of the product would be exposed to air and then the following model was developed: a leak produces a pool of liquids on the surface which is "fed" by the leak, and both evaporates and "drains" away. Figure 15 shows a simple schematic of the model. To estimate the evaporation rates as a function of the inflow rate (i.e. the pipeline leak rate), let us make a few assumptions: 1) Assume the surface area of the pool is 2m x 2m (4 m 2 ). 2) Assume that the pool is without containment (i.e. drains away), and according to the EPA model has a depth of 10 mm. 3) Assume the total volume of the pool (40 litres) remains constant. 4) Assume that the inflow of liquid mixes rapidly with the liquid in the pool.
Figure 15: Schematic of Evaporation Pool Model
To assist in the numerical modelling of the evaporation rate, rather than assume that the in-flow is continuous, we shall assume that the inflow happens as a "slug" of liquid which enters the pool every minute. Also, we shall begin with the pool being empty and draining only beginning from the pool once it has reached a depth of 10 mm (40 litres volume). The model tracks how much of each "slug" of leaked liquid remains in the pool over time, plus the total evaporation from the pool. The model was run for a 240 minute period (i.e. 240 "slugs" of leaked liquid). Figure 16 shows the rate of evaporation of OSA as measured in a wind tunnel experiment completed earlier by Synodon. This data is the measured evaporation rate from a 6.625" diameter plate of OSA synthetic crude oil and a wind speed of 1.2 m/s. The decrease in evaporation rates over time is caused by the rapid evaporation of the lighter components in the liquid (leaving the heavier slower to evaporate components), and a reduction in temperature of the sample (due to evaporative cooling). The red line in Figure 16 shows a best fit line of evaporation rate interpolated in the model. To adjust from the small sample in the wind tunnel to the model pool size of 4 m 2 and variable wind speed, the EPA evaporation model presented earlier was applied. (i.e. evaporation varies linearly with area, and varies to the power of 0.78 with wind speed). Figure 18 shows the modelled steady-state evaporation rates for OSA as a function of the leak rate (into the pool) and wind speed (2.5 to 10 km/hr). Also shown on this figure is the field measured instrument minimum sensitivity to OSA of 0.035 lpm (or 30 g/min). The model shows that the evaporation of OSA from a 4 m 2 pool of leaked OSA will be "detectable" by this technology for low winds speeds ≥5 km/hr and leak rates ≥0.5 lpm (4.5 bpd). Also, lower leak rates are "detectable" if wind speeds are higher.
Figure 18: Flow-meter and Scale Readout
There are a couple of observations which can be made about this model that can provide some insight into the results:
a) The wind tunnel test of evaporation rates did not control the temperature of the sample. As such the sample cooled as it evaporated, slowing the evaporation rate. In reality, the temperature of the pool will be moderated (i.e. warmed) by the ground and the liquid entering the pool. b) The lighter more rapidly evaporating components would tend to rise to the surface of the pool. The model assumes it is instantly and always perfectly mixed.
These observations, for the most part suggests that the results of the presented model are conservative, and that both the real evaporation rates should be higher than the model suggests and the instrument's minimum detectable plume size could be lower.
-INSPECTION FREQUENCY DETERMINATION
Modern pipeline risk analysis recognizes two forms of assumed risk from leaks: the probability of a leak occurring; and the impact that the leak will have once it has occurred.
Whereas pipeline integrity management procedures and other leak prevention measures have an impact on reducing the pipeline failure risk, it can never reduce the probability of a leak to zero. The volume of an unintended release depends on the leak rate and the length of time before the leak is detected, with the leak rate in turn primarily dependent on the pipeline pressure and defect hole size. In order to determine the impact that any leak detection technology would have on limiting the spill size, some understanding of the leak rate distribution would be required. Unfortunately, the majority of the release data cataloged in North America only captures the total release volume (such as the PHMSA dataset discussed in Section 1). To circumvent this problem, a methodology and dataset published by Det Norske Veritas, Norway (DNV) was applied that provides the hole size distribution for hydrocarbon equipment including pipelines. DNV's data is derived from the Hydrocarbon Release Database (HCRD) which has been compiled by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) over a 20 year period as described in [3]. The database contains details of over 4000 leak events at oil and gas installations in the UK Continental Shelf. The primary goal for DNV's methodology is to derive failure rate frequencies for different types of equipment but for this analysis, we are only interested in the hole size distribution derived from this data.
Figure 19: Leak Hole Size Occurrence Frequency
From the graph in Figure 19 [3] it can be derived that leaks caused by smaller diameter holes occur much more frequently than leaks due to larger holes. Intuitively this makes sense as corrosion processes are not likely to result in a very large diameter hole instantaneously but rather allow a hole to grow in size over time. The PHMSA data presented in Section 1 also seems to support this indirectly through its distribution of total spill amounts as presented in Figure 20 . The pipeline aerial surveillance frequency with the Synodon technology is driven primarily by the goal to reduce the volume of product that can be released due to a leak caused by a pinhole. As established earlier, a SCADA/CPM system will typically be capable of alarming leaks down to about 1% of the pipeline flow. For a 100 kbpd pipeline operating at 5,000 kPa, this would correspond to a significant 1000 bpd leak rate originating from a 6 mm diameter hole.
In Section 3 we demonstrated that the lower end hydrocarbon leak rate sensitivity threshold for Synodon's technology is around 4.5 bpd. The hole size that would result in a leak of this magnitude from the pipeline presented above is 0.4 mm.
Let us consider two surveillance intervals for this analysis: 30 days and 90 days. Since the likelihood of a leak developing is randomly distributed over these intervals, we can use the midway point for a typical case analysis and the entire interval as the worst case scenario. Other holes sizes can develop in the pipeline than the smallest one detectable by Synodon's system and in general, the leak rate increases with the square of the defect radius. At the same time however, the likelihood of larger holes developing decreases linearly with the radius (Figure 19 ). To illustrate this, the numbers in Table 2 have been calculated for a 0.8 mm defect using the same assumptions as presented in Table 1 . From the graph in Figure 19 we can extrapolate that the likelihood of a 0.8 mm defect developing in the pipeline is roughly half (50%) that for a 0.4 mm hole.
Suncor plans to use this information in its risk management process to optimize surveillance frequency.
-CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a series of arguments that support new, technology enabled method for detecting small, pinhole hydrocarbon pipeline leaks. The limitations of the existing SCADA/CPM systems highlight the opportunity to enhance the detection of leaks below 1000 bpd.. Synodon has demonstrated its technologies ability at detecting these small leaks down to roughly 4.5 bpd. Given this new capability, a pipeline operator can determine the optimal surveillance frequency based on their unique risk profile. 
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